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January 2011
PREDICTIONS, OBSERVATIONS, AND THE FREE LUNCH
Colonel Louis H. Jordan, Jr.
My first prediction for the New Year was going to be that Don’t Ask; Don’t Tell
(DADT) would be repealed, but in a surprise move the outgoing Congress beat me to it
by making that a reality. Now comes the time for the certification process and implementation. The public is tired of the continued debate, the readiness argument is long
suspected of being a red herring, and policies viewed as exclusionary usually have a
very limited shelf life. The date on the toe-tag will be 2011.
My second prediction is that our Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen will salute
smartly and make the repeal of DADT work just as they do with any other challenge.
Regardless of where one stands on the issue, the members of the uniformed services
generally suppress their personal opinions once a decision is made and move out with
purpose to accomplish the mission. These professionals made integration of the races
and the genders work; they will make this new policy work as well. The profession will
survive and continue to thrive.
Those who benefited from racial and gender integration have successfully assimilated into the armed forces and continue to perform magnificently. Just ask the families
of the two African American Medal of Honor recipients who received their medals
posthumously for action during the Korean War, our first conflict after integration.1
Before Korea and integration, there were only 57 medals awarded to African American
soldiers.2 Additionally, ask the two female soldiers who were awarded the Silver Star
for combat action in Iraq and Afghanistan. They provide strong evidence that we
should soon resolve the argument that women cannot perform in combat.3 Of course,
there will be some stray interviews and Op-Eds, but leaders will lead, and the new
policy will be followed just like the previous policies that were as equally contentious in
their day were followed. I am confident.
On the observation side, the announcement of the extension of our commitment in
Afghanistan to the year 2014 marks a major and healthy strategic re-look. Stability in
Afghanistan is in our national interest, as well as in the interests of the nations
represented by the NATO mission there. We need to continually reconsider the
strategies that we develop that address the evolving threats to our national security,
especially since strategies that fail to adapt to changing conditions are usually doomed
to failure.

As we move into a post-OIF and post-OEF strategic environment, we should also reexamine our national interests. Is it in our interest to spread democracy throughout the
Islamic world? Is our form of democracy right for everyone? Are we more secure for
that effort? Which is more dangerous, a nuclear Iran or an unstable Mexico? Who is
more of a threat to our national security? The La Familia Drug Cartel and Los Zetas, or
Iranians?
The second observation is really two that are interconnected. We will need to reexamine the role of our reserve forces, and nurture our veterans once we bring them
home from combat. The second and third order effects of OIF and OEF will be larger
than that of any previous conflict, and the impact on our reserve forces will be more
serious than at any other time since World War II. Moreover, since the average
American lives longer, the national commitment to them will concomitantly be for a
longer period.
First, we should look at aligning our light and special operations forces in the Active
Component and move the heavier forces into the Reserve Component where they can
be prepared for prolonged kinetic operations that, presumably, would be characterized
by longer warning times. OIF and OEF both put to rest the concern by some about the
ability to have access to the National Guard, a major argument for maintaining two
Reserve Components. The time may be ripe to gain some efficiency by combining the
Reserve and the National Guard into one Reserve Component (RC) that supports an
expeditionary Active Component. This new RC could be employed more effectively in
the “dual” constitutional missions of today’s National Guard, making our reserve forces
truly strategic and effectively operational when required. We should come to the
realization that neither the Active Component nor the Reserve Component can be
everything to everybody all the time.
The second part of the observation brings us cause for concern for the coming year.
We are locked in one of the worst economic crises since the Great Depression, and we
are entering a period with the largest group of returning veterans since Viet Nam. At
the same time, another wave of retirees of the All Volunteer Force will begin to “hang
up their spurs.” These veterans entered the military under a set of expectations for their
military service based on a promise from the society they serve. The “deal” is that those
who join the military agree to risk their lives to defend the nation at the direction of the
civilian leadership. In return, the nation will agree to take care of the service member
and their families with medical care when wounded, insurance when fallen, and a
secure retirement upon completion of a faithful, full career. This is a sacred compact, a
crucial element of the all-volunteer professional military, and a centerpiece of civilmilitary relations. Though this is the same contract entered by previous career service
members, the sheer size of our professional career military dwarfs previous generations.
Many in our freshman class in the 112th Congress, the Class of 2011 ran on a
platform of reducing spending and cutting entitlements. We must remind ourselves
that military retirement and benefits come from the “entitlement” account. These benefits are the price the nation pays to ensure we have the most professional and powerful
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military in the world. The choice to pay these entitlements was made when we discarded the conscription force. Many now will argue that a return to the conscription
force would reconcile a perceived rift between the military and the civilian society it
serves.
A cut in retirement benefits could create a far worse moral burden as opposed to a
financial burden if we renege on the sacred compact between the military member and
the society he or she serves. Though the talk of providing a lump sum pay-out at retirement, similar to other armies, may save millions initially, such a plan may potentially
cost more over time.4 We have tried these economic experiments before. Examples are
available, such as the 1932 adjustment to Service Certificate Law of 1924, which resulted
in the ill-fated Bonus March. Post-conflict “Reductions in Force,” when done with a
broad brush, eliminate whole generations of talent that cannot be replaced. A more
recent example of a not well thought out financial efficiency was the Redux retirement
plan of 1986. It may have been one of the causes of a migration of a whole generation of
military expertise. Only an amendment in 2000 providing for a $30,000 lump sum
payout made the program moderately acceptable. In the end, Redux may have cost us
more than what it saved.
Granted, the Defense Department and supporting industries will have to take a
share in cuts as we come out of our current operations. That is only reasonable. However, a slash across the board to entitlements, though appealing to some, will break faith
with our military and may cost us some of our best and brightest. It is a cost we cannot
afford.
Yet, opening military service to a wider segment of the population may strengthen
civil-military relations. A re-look at our national interests and security needs, along
with a reapportionment of forces, may gain real efficiencies. Defense cuts should be
well thought out and based on national interests and our security requirements rather
than economics alone. This would be a thoughtful approach to defense budget
reductions as opposed to an expedient way out achieved by cutting a wide swath
through the defense budget.
One should remember we get what we pay for and, as the saying goes, “there is no
free lunch.”
ENDNOTES
1. Sergeant Cornelius H Charlton and Private First Class William H. Thompson, Washington, DC:
Center for Military History, available from www.history.army.mil/html/moh/koreanwar.html.
2. Though President Truman ordered desegregation of the Armed Forces in 1948, full desegregation
did not occur until 1953, available from www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/desegregation/
large/index.php?action=chronology.
3. Sergeant Leigh Ann Hester was the first since WWII in 2005, and Specialist Monica Lin Brown the
second in 2008. However, Specialist Brown was removed from combat after the action because of the rule
banning women from direct combat action, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2008/04/30/AR2008043003415.html.
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4. The British Army offers a lump sum nontaxable payout along with a smaller annual pension.
Singapore offers a lump sum and mandatory retirement at age 45.
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